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Law, Social Change and Child Snatching
ChristopherCarlson *
PaulLansing **
Thomas Sweeney
INTRODUCTION
"[The] rapidity of modem social change ...demands a legal system
that does not slowly adjust to social problems.... Rather, the system
must increasingly anticipate, implement, and direct the change in
order to maximize the realization of desired values. 1

To determine how well the law performs, one must continuously question the legal system's capacity to adapt to and direct
social change. How is the system informed about the nature and
causes of social change and how does it respond? Critical to this
inquiry are the interactions within the legal system of legislators, judges, practicing attorneys, bar associations, governmental officials, and social forces to fashion legal policy. 2 An especially instructive case study of law and social change is child
snatching, or the abduction of one's own child, because one can
discern who initiated action within the legal system, how the
action was commenced, and why specific parts of the system
were approached when they were.3 Such a study also affords
insights into the contributions and limitations of the actors
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1. Dienes, Judges, Legislators, and Social Change, 13 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 511,520(1970).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 513.
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involved in child custody problems. Not least, an examination of
child snatching reveals distressing realities about the American
family and the malfunction of law in contemporary life, a condition certain to affect our society in the future.
Some of the questions this article attempts to answer are
whether the legal system has acted too quickly or too slowly in
dealing with the problems of child snatching; whether the adversarial nature of the court system and statutory law have combined to exacerbate rather than eradicate child snatching; and
whether legislative responses have addressed the symptoms or
the underlying causes of child snatching. Initially, the article
discusses the contemporary social context out of which child
snatching emerged and reviews the history behind the criteria
for determining child custody. It then considers the impact of the
initial legal response to child snatching, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, as well as the legislative-political history
and impact of the second response, the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980. Finally, the article examines the traditional means of resolving child custody conflicts and recommends several alternative approaches.
DIVORCE, CUSTODY CONFLICTS, AND RELITIGATION

Although child snatching captured the attention of the media
and the legal field in the late 1970's, 4 its emergence as a serious
social problem must be placed within the context of the fundamental social and legal changes of the 1960's and early 1970's.
During this time divorce rates mushroomed, child custody statutes underwent significant changes, and the work and family
roles of men and women shifted radically.5 As a result, the decisions of lawyers and judges in resolving custody disputes became
more complex. Alongside this complexity developed a concomitant swell of dissatisfaction with the methods and standards of
the legal system.6 An understanding of child snatching and the
turmoil it has created in American courtrooms requires an examination of the factors that produced the phenomenon.

4.
5.

See text of congressional hearings on this subject cited infra notes 119-21, 137-41.
See infra notes 39-44.
6. See, e.g., H. IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION (1980); M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DiSPOSABLE PARENT (1978) Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: Legislative Reform, 16 TRIAL MAG.
22 (1980).
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Foremost among these factors is the unparalleled rise in the
number of divorces in the past two decades. While divorce rates
actually dropped slightly during the 1950's from their World War
II highs, 1960 and 1970 rates more than compensated for this
temporary decline. Between 1960 and 1979, the divorce rate
climbed from 9.2 to 22.8 per 1000 married women, 7 approximately a fourfold increase in the number of divorces in twenty
years.8 In addition, despite decisions to postpone having children and the resulting decline in the birthrate,9 the proportion of
divorcing couples with and without children remained relatively
constant. 10 The increased divorce rate has thus resulted in a cor-

7.

DIVORCE STATISTICS: 1960 TO 1979.

1960
Divorces
Number
Rate per 1000 total population
Rate per 1000 married women
15 years and over

1970

1979

393,000
2.0
9.2

708,000
3.5
14.9

1,170,000
5.4
22.8

Divorces Involving Minor Children
Number
Percent of all divorces

223,000
56.7

424,000
59.9

Not available
56.3*

Number of Children Experiencing
Parental Divorce

463,000

870,000

1,181,000

Minor Children Living with a Divorced
or Separated Parent**
Number living with mother
2,697,000
4,633,000
7,237,000
Number living with father
258,000
345,000
749,000
Percent living with father
8.7
6.9
9.4
*
An estimate based on Divorce Area Registration statistics reported in Table 5 in
ADVANCE REPORT OF FNAL DIVORCE STATISTICS,

1979 6 (May 29, 1981).

** The number of children living with divorced and separated parents are derived from
Table 4 in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS: MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH, 1979 5 (1980) and Glick

& Norton, Marrying, Divorcing, and Living Together in the United States Today, 32
POP. BULL. 28 (1977).
Another source used in the compilation of these statistics is BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND CHILD SUPPORT (1977).

8. It is worth noting that divorce rates have remained relatively stable over the last
several years, suggesting that we have reached a plateau, at least for the time being. The
estimated divorce rates per 1,000 population were 5.2 in 1980, 5.3 in 1981, and 5.3 in 1982.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANNUAL SUMMARY OF BIRTHS, DEATH, MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: UNITED STATES, 1981 1 (1982); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES
AND DEATHS FOR 1982: MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 1 (1983).

9. See Glick, A DemographerLooks at American Families, 37 J. MARR. & FAM. 15,
15-26 (1975).
10. See supra note 7.
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responding increase in the number of divorces involving minor
children. In fact, the number of minor children experiencing a
parental divorce has increased by about 155 percent. As a consequence, the courts were deciding the custodial fate of over one
million children a year by 1979.11
Historically, when parents divorced, the courts awarded custody of the children to only one parent. More recently, courts
12
have granted the noncustodial parent specific visitation rights.
For the parent who does not receive custody, a divorce signals a
severe restriction on the time spent with a child and may mean
the end of the relationship. Not surprisingly, this prospect leads
to vehement disagreements on custody issues.13 Although each
parent in a custody struggle may genuinely believe that a custody award to the other parent would be detrimental to the
child's welfare, it may be that such struggles are actually paren14
tal attempts to exact retribution from each other.
Estimating the frequency with which couples engage in disputes over children is difficult because it is not possible to draw a
hard and fast line between those divorces that are contested on
custody issues and those that are not. 15 Although empirical
research on this topic is extremely scant, apparently fewer than
five percent of divorcing couples with children actually contest
custody in court.' 6 This figure, however, does not account for
those couples who disagree on custody initially, but who reach a
resolution prior to a court hearing. 17 Further, although custody

11. Id.
12. This situation is beginning to change as more couples begin to experiment with
joint custody and more states allow judges to make joint custody determinations. Eleven
states presently have laws specifically authorizing joint custody. See D. LUEPNITZ, CHILD
CUSTODY 4 (1982).
13. See W. GOODE. AFTER DIVORCE (1956) (reprinted as WOMEN IN DIVORCE in 1965); M.
HUNT & B. HUNT, THE DIVORCE EXPERIENCE (1979); R. WEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION (1975).
14. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

(1973). See also R. WEISS, supra note 13, at 109.
15.

M. WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN 18

(1980).

16. This estimate is based on Robert Levy's research on custody investigations in
Minnesota, which will be published by the American Bar Association in 1983.
17. For example, one recent study found that 20% of divorcing couples disagreed
initially about custody issues. Kohen, Brown & Feldberg, Divorced Mothers: The Cost
and Benefits of Female Control, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION 232 (G. Levinger & 0. Moles
ed. 1979). This figure is very close to a 1956 finding that 16% of divorcing couples dis-

agreed over custodial arrangements. See W. GOODE, supra note 13, at 313. In both these
studies, however, the estimates were based only on reports from wives. If questioned, the

husbands may have answered quite differently and estimates may have been higher.
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is rarely disputed during divorce proceedings, evidence suggests
that litigation following a divorce decree is rampant.1 8 In fact, it
appears that rather than ending custody conflict between parents, the divorce decree signals their beginning. A study in Wisconsin, for example, found that in childless divorces only five
percent of the partners returned to court to enforce or modify a
decree within two years. 19 The corresponding figure for divorces
involving children, however, was fifty-two percent. 20 Similarly, a
Denver study found that fifty-five percent of divorcing couples
who had originally disagreed about custody, but who had not
necessarily challenged the matter in court, returned to court
within a year to modify their divorce decrees. 21 While not all relitigation following divorce concerns children, a significant portion arises from specific custody arrangements and includes disputes over visitation, child support, and legal custody.
The dramatic increase in the divorce rate over the past twenty
years has been accompanied by simultaneous increases in custody disputes. 22 Predictably, these disputes result in extreme bitterness and disappointment on the part of many participants. In
addition, changes in traditional custody rules have emerged with
the rising divorce rate and have, at least in the short run,
increased the dissatisfaction and frustration of parents who lose
custody battles.

Some observers have suggested that the percentage of custody disputes is increasing
because of a greater likelihood that fathers will press claims for custody. See Orthner &
Lewis, Evidence of Single Father Competence in Childrearing,13 FAM. L.Q. 27 (1979).
However, there is an absence of longitudinal data to support this claim and, at present, it
remains no more than a hypothesis.
18. See infra notes 19-20.
19. See M. WHEELER, supra note 15, at 13.
20. Id.
21. See Pearson & Thoennes, The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, 4 FAM. ADvOC. 26, 31
(1982). This percentage is obtained by adding the top two figures in the last column of the
chart found on page 31. These numbers represent the percentage of individuals in the
control group who returned to court within 12 months.
22. Longitudinal evidence documenting increases in the absolute number of child custody disputes does not exist. However, some evidence suggests that family-related matters now dominate American courtrooms. A study of two trial courts in California
revealed that in 1970 domestic cases composed over 50% of the civil load of these two
courts. See Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San
Benito Counties, 10 LAw. & Soc'Y REV. 267, 280 (1976). Of course, not all family-related
cases involve struggles between parents over the custody of children. For example, a
recent study of divorced parents found that 56%of divorced mothers with custody of their
children returned to court to enforce child support payments. See D. LUEPNTZ, supra note
12, at 67. Disputes over property and visitation also bring divorced parents to court.
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The Emergence of the "Best Interests" Principle
Although the father's right to custody of his children was irrebuttable in England prior to 1800, it was never absolute in the
United States. 23 American courts asserted that the father's right
derived not from any natural law, but from a presumption that
paternal custody furthered the child's best interests. 24 Thus, what
is often considered the modern doctrine of the "child's best interests" actually appeared as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. 25 Thereafter, powerful cultural conceptions of the
family and men's and women's roles operated to assure that the
best interest of the child was not open to question. Until the midnineteenth century, mothers rarely gained custody of their chil26
dren when couples divorced.
The paternal preference was clearly based in the organization
of early nineteenth century family life. The father was not only
responsible for the support of his children, but was thought to
best understand the workings of society by virtue of his position
as head of the family enterprise. 27 He was thus considered best
suited to educate and rear his children. The mother, on the other
hand, was viewed as requiring the direction of the male head of
the family and essentially incapable of supporting children or
28
preparing them for adult roles.
This view of the family and the mother's role in child rearing
29
began to change dramatically in the mid-nineteenth century.
As the United States industrialized and men began to work outside the home, the family was treated less as an enterprise than
as a haven or retreat from the outside world. 30 Women became
the guardians and natural inhabitants of the home l and respon23. Foster & Freed, Life with Father:1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 325-26 (1978).
24. Derdeyn, Child Custody Contests in Historical Perspective,in ANNUAL PROGRESS
IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND CHILI) DEVELOPMENT 713, 715 (S. Chess & A. Thomas ed. 1977).
25. Foster & Freed, supra note 23, at 327.
26. Vandepol, Dependent Children, Child Custody and the Mothers Pensions: The
Transformationof State-Family Relations in the Early Twentieth Century, 29 SOC. PROB.
221, 227 (1982).
27. Weiss, Issues in the Adjudication of Custody When Parents Separate, in DIVORCE
AND SEPARATION 325 (G. Levinger & 0. Moles ed. 1979).
28. Id. at 326.
29. Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966).
30. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977); Jeffrey, The Family as Utopian
Retreat from the City, in THE FAMILY, COMMUNES AND UTOPIAN SOCIETIES 21 (S. TeSelle
ed. 1972).
31. J. JEFFREY, FRONTIER WOMEN (1979).
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sibility for the socialization of children devolved to them.3 2
Eventually, these social changes altered the legal criteria used
in making custody awards, when a maternal preference replaced
the earlier prejudice in favor of the father.3 3 Often referred to as
the "tender years doctrine," the maternal presumption derived
from the belief that women were the natural caretakers of children 34 and, like the paternal preference, reflected a particular
cultural view of the family. By 1900, the courts were regularly
awarding custody to the mother 35 and several states had passed
laws mandating that the mother be considered the preferred
36
parent.
The 1960's and 1970's witnessed the erosion, but not the disappearance, of the maternal presumption. Gradually, state courts
and legislatures began to assert that the "best interest of the
child" would be served by abandoning presumptions in favor of
either parent.3 7 As was true of previous changes in child custody
laws, the nascent triumph of the best interest principle originated in changes in the organization of family life, most basic of
which was the entry of married women with children into the
labor force in large numbers. 38 Accompanying this influx were
altered conceptions of the roles of men and women in child rearing. The nineteenth century notion that women were naturally
fit to rear children was perpetuated in the twentieth century by
psychological theories that purported to demonstrate a maternal
39
instinct or a natural attachment between mother and child.
Sociological theories, in addition, suggested that a division of
labor between men and women was a universal as well as a
functional necessity.10 In the 1970's, however, social science

32. See Vandepol, supra note 26, at 227.
33. Id. at 228.
34. Weiss, supra note 27, at 326.
35. Derdeyn, supra note 24, at 719.
36. Weiss, supra note 27, at 327; Vandepol, supra note 26, at 228.
37. A 1978 review of statutes and court decisions revealed that the "tender years doctrine" has been specifically rejected in 22 states, remaining in effect as "gospel" to "tie
breaker" in the rest. See Foster & Freed, supra note 23, at 332.
38. In 1950, 18% of married women with children under eighteen and 12% of married
women with children under six worked outside the home. By 1980, these percentages were
54 and 45 respectively. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TRENDS IN CHILI) CARE ARRANGEMENTS OF
WORKING MOTHERS (1982).

39. Wortis, The Acceptance of the Concept of the Maternal Role by Behavioral Scientists: Its Effects on Women, 41 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 733 (1971).
40. Parsons, Family Structure and the Socialization of the Child, in FAMILY. SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION PROCESS 35 (T. Parsons & R. Bales ed. 1955).
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research began to demonstrate the parenting capabilities of men,
as well as men's importance in child rearing. 41 The same period
also witnessed an upsurge in the interest on the part of men in
child care. 42 Not only is it becoming clear that fathers are able to
care for their children, it is also true that many children are now
cared for by someone other than a parent. 43 These developments
have made retention of a maternal preference in custody cases
difficult.
With the increasing obsolescence of the relatively unambiguous standards associated with the "best interests" and "tender
years" doctrines came the search for new custody criteria. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 44 for example, lists five factors to be used in deciding custody disputes: the wishes of the
child's parents, the wishes of the child, the interaction of the
child with his parents, the child's adjustment to home, school
and community, and the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 45 Some states have expanded this list to include
factors ranging from the specific capabilities of each parent to
the preferences of the child. 46 Such factors suggest that judges
subject the emotional life of the family to intense scrutiny when
47
deciding what is best for a child.
The criteria contained in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act and various state statutes are understandably difficult to
apply, and many judges have stated that custody decisions are
among the most difficult that they make.48 While in some
instances one parent may clearly be the best choice for custody,

41. See, e.g., K. ROSENTHAL & H. KESHET, FATHERS WITHOUT PARTNERS (1981); Fein,
Research on Fathering:Social Policy and the Emergent Perspective,34 J. Soc. ISSUES 122
(1978); Parke & Sawin, Father's Role in Infancy: A Re-evaluation, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR
365(1976).
42. As evidence one can point to the popular books on fatherhood that appeared in the
1970's. See, e.g., F. DODSON, HOW TO FATHER (1974); M. GREEN, FATHERING (1977); J.
LEVINE, WHO WILL RAISE THE CHILDREN? NEW OPTIONS FOR FATHERS (1976).

43. See Note, The Father'sRight to Custody in InterparentalDisputes, 49 TuL L REV.
189 (1974).
44. 9A U.L.A. § 402 (1979).
45. Id.
46. For example, Michigan includes several additional factors that the court should
weigh in deciding custody such as the moral fitness of the competing parties, the capacities of the competing parties to nurture the child, and the emotional ties between the
competing parties and the child. MICH. SPAT. ANN. § 25.312(3) (Callaghan 1974).
47. Derdyn, Child Custody: A Reflection of Cultural Change, 7 J. CLINICAL & CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY 172 (1978).
48. M. WHEELER, supra note 15, at 24.
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in many others each parent is equally involved with and capable
of rearing the child. 49 In the latter situation, any custody award
is bound to generate dissatisfaction in the noncustodial parent.5 0 In addition, the new criteria, while attemping specificity,
allow a great deal of latitude for subjective judgments. 5 1 Judges
may therefore reach radically different decisions in similar
52
cases.
Perhaps more important in generating dissatisfaction over
custody awards is the failure of judicial decisions to keep pace
with the legal and social changes that have occurred in the last
two decades. Although the law now defines both men and women
as "fit" to rear children,5 3 several commentators have suggested
that judges continue to employ a maternal presumption in making awards,5 4 with mothers receiving custody in nine out of ten
cases.5 5 The number of fathers' rights groups that have formed
in recent years illustrates men's frustration with this continued
trend.5 6 Thus, while society encourages men to become more
involved in the care of their children, and evidence indicates this
is occurring,5 7 the prospects of divorced men gaining custody of
their children are dismal. As a result, a perception of the legal
system as contradictory and unfair has developed.

49.

See Foster & Freed, supra note 23, at 332.

50.

M. WHEELER, supra note 15, at 24.

51. Id. at 36; Orthner & Iewis, supra note 17, at 33-34.
52. Although the new criteria attempt to provide an objective standard for custody
decisions, they lack the one virtue that the old standards had: clarity. In fact, one analyst
has likened contemporary custody decisions based on the new criteria to a lottery. H.
IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION 126 (1980).
53. Foster & Freed, supra note 23, at 332.
54. See M. WHEELER, supra note 15, at 36; Kram & Frank, The Future of the Tender
Years Doctrine, 12 TRIAL MAG. 14 (1976); ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 6, at 164; Weiss,
supra note 27, at 327.
55. As shown in the Table, supra note 7, the percentage of children living with their
fathers has increased only slightly in the last 20 years. It is becoming easier for fathers,
however, to obtain custody of their children, as reported in a recent North Carolina survey, where judges stated that they awarded custody to the father in one-half of all contested cases. See Orthner & Lewis, supra note 17, at 28. Similar findings were reported in
California. Id. at 29. These statistics, however, do not account for the advice of counsel to
fathers not to pursue custody. Id. at 27. See also D. LUEPNITZ, supra note 12, at 25.
56.

I. VICTOR & W. WINKLER, FATHERS AND CUSTODY 120-24 (1977).

57. For example, more men have become involved in the daily care of their children as
their wives enter the labor force. In 1975 about two-thirds of children three to thirteen
years of age whose mothers worked were cared for in the home by one of their parents. J.
SCANZONI & L. SCANZONI, MEN, WOMEN AND CHANGE 342 (1981).
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CHILD SNATCHING

The increasing number of conflicts between divorcing and
divorced parents and the growing distrust of the legal system
form the background against which the emergence of child
snatching must be viewed. More couples with children are
divorcing than ever before, 58 and many of them have lost confidence in the ability of the legal system to resolve their disputes
fairly and justly.5 9 Whether dissatisfied with a custody decree or
the anticipation of one, unhappy with the workings of a specific
custody arrangement, or seeking revenge against a spouse, many
parents have resorted to child snatching to resolve their disputes
or vent their frustrations. 60 While very little is actually known
about parents who steal their children, a recent study of police
records in Los Angeles County found that approximately seventy percent of those charged with parental kidnapping were men.61 It
comes as no surprise that men are the primary perpetrators of
this crime since most divorced men do not receive custody of
62
their children.
It is on the question of motive, however, that the greatest lack
of information exists, although several different theories on the
issue have surfaced. Representatives of parents' groups testifying at Senate hearings on child snatching maintained that
revenge is the primary force behind child snatching and discounted such motives as love of the child and protection of the
child's interests. 63 Feminists have also emphasized the role of
revenge, suggesting that child snatching is an attempt by men
58. See supra note 7.
59. As examples of this lost confidence, see the testimony of fathers' rights groups
during the Senate hearings on the Parental Kidnapping Act. ParentalKidnappingPrevention Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryand the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-103 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on PKPA].
60. In the 1970's numerous articles in popular magazines proclaimed an "epidemic" of
child snatching. See, e.g., Child Snatching Epidemic Stirs a Storm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 3, 1979, at 57; Most, ParentAgainst Parent: The Child StealingEpidemic, 224
NATION 559 (1977). However, accurate statistics on the incidence of child snatching do not
exist. Unofficial estimates place the number of child thefts between 25,000 and 100,000
per year. M. AGOPIAN, PARENTAL CHILD STEALING 23 (1981).
61. M. AGOPIAN, supranote 60, at 59.
62. Orthner & Lewis, supra note 17, at 27. In fact, because 90% of custody decrees
favor the mother, it appears that women are proportionately overrepresented in parental
kidnapping cases. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
63. Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 64.
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to strike back at women who seek independence through di64
vorce.
Fathers' rights groups, meanwhile, have presented a contrary
view of the motives of child snatchers. In testimony before the
Senate committee on federal child snatching legislation, representatives of such groups suggested that the cause of parental
kidnapping lies in the unjust laws that give women sole custody
of children after divorce. 65 A recent book on fathers and custody
has aptly described the dilemma of the divorced father: "He is
faced with the choice of being either a functioning father or a
law abiding citizen." 66 Under this view, child snatching is the
result of a genuine but frustrated desire on the part of fathers to
maintain continuing relationships with their children.
There is some validity in each explanation advanced as to the
motives of parents who kidnap their children. Together they
illustrate the complexity of the social and legal changes out of
which child snatching arose. 67 This phenomenon has also been
encouraged by the way in which child custody laws are implemented.
The Law as an Incentive to Self-Help

Until recently, the legal system actually encouraged a parent
to engage in child abduction. Several factors contributed to this
result. First, jurisdictional rules in most states gave more than
one court the authority to make the initial custody determination
or to modify the decree of a sister state. 68 Although historically a
state court had jurisdiction only if that state were the child's
domicile, 69 modern jurisdictional rules also allowed a state court
to assume jurisdiction if the child were physically present in the

64. Gelder, Beyond Custody: When Parents Steal Their Own Children, Ms. MAG.,
May, 1978, at 52.
65. Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 93.
66. VICTOR & WINKLER, supra note 56, at 78.
67. In his study of child snatching in Los Angeles, Agopian concluded that the most
common motives of parents who abducted their children were the following: a desire for a
more permanent relationship with the child, a belief that an ex-spouse was an unfit parent, and an attempt to use the child as leverage to re-establish a relationship with a
spouse. Agopian minimizes the role of revenge in child snatching. See M. AGOPIAN, supra
note 60, at 96.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 69-72.
69. 1 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAW § 9.5 (1935). See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.1 (1968).
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state70 or if the state had jurisdiction over both parents. 71 Thus,
if a child were domiciled in one state but physically present in
another, two courts could have jurisdiction over the same case.
Ideally, the state court with the most complete knowledge of the
child's situation would hear the case, and the other courts would
follow the principles of comity and self-restraint and decline
jurisdiction. 72 This was not the case, however, due to certain
legal presumptions which encouraged the courts to respond to
custody petitions.
Under the doctrine of parens patriae,the state, as guardian of
persons under legal disability, had a direct interest in the outcome of a custody battle brought within the jurisdiction. 73 Because the standard for awarding custody was the child's best
interests, 74 the state courts generally examined the custodial circumstances of the child regardless of whether another court
might also have jurisdiction. Their exercise of jurisdiction could
75
then be justified in a post hoc manner.
Although well intentioned, this ready assumption of jurisdiction by state courts helped facilitate child snatching. If a custody
decree had not yet been granted, the parent with possession of
the child had a significant advantage in the struggle for legal
custody. Possession frequently enabled one parent to choose the
forum and be favored as the local petitioner, while the other parent was forced to litigate in a distant forum.7 6 Further, until a

70. See, e.g., Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1976); Finlay v. Finlay, 240
N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
71. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 Ill. App. 2d 295, 222 N.E.2d 340 (1966); Jackson v.
Jackson, 241 S.C. 1, 126 S.E.2d 855 (1962).
72. See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). The approach
of accepting alternative bases of initial jurisdiction was adopted in the Second Restatement and was widely accepted by the states. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW
§ 79 (1971).
73. See, e.g., Helton v. Crawler, 241 Iowa 296, 312, 41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950); See generally H. CLARK, supra note 69, §§ 17.1, 17.2; 43 C.J.S. Infants § 5 (1978).
74. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541-42 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); New
York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring); In re
Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1964). For a general discussion of the

evolution of the "best interests of the child" standard, see Blakesley, Child Custody and
ParentalAuthority in France,Louisiana, and Other States of the United States: A ComparativeAnalysis, 4 B.C. INrL& COMP. I- REv. 283, 315 (1981).
75. See H. CLARK, supra note 69, § 11.5.
76. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65
CAL. L. REv. 978, 995 (1977).
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custody decree had been issued, the courts could not consider it
wrongful for one parent to have possession, even if gained by
77
abduction, since both parents were legally entitled to custody.
The time for child snatching was thus ripe after custody proceedings had commenced but before the final decree.
Even if a state court had issued a custody decree, the parent
denied legal custody could easily find another forum willing to
relitigate the issue. 78 Although some courts applied the "clean
79
hands doctrine" and would not assist the child snatcher, most

courts agreed to take jurisdiction on the basis that the child
should not be punished for the wrongdoing of the parent.80 The
parent without legal custody could therefore take a child to a
potentially more favorable forum to modify the original custody
decree, even though the proceeding involved essentially the same
81
set of facts.
Apart from jurisdictional problems and legal presumptions,
the criminal penalties and civil remedies available to the parent
with legal custody were also woefully inadequate to discourage
child abduction. Although child snatching is literally the criminal act of kidnapping,8 2 federal8 3 and state kidnapping statutes
have traditionally exempted parents from prosecution.8 4 The

77. See, e.g., Hunt v. Hunt, 94 Ga. 257, 21 S.E. 515 (1894). See generally Blakesley,
supra note 74, at 342.
78. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioner's PrefatoryNote, 9
U.L.A. 111, 112 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UCCJA].
79. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L REv. 345
(1953). See generally UCCJA, supra note 78, at 142-43.
80. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 276, 413 P.2d 744, 749
(1966); Smith v. Smith, 43 Del. 268, 274, 45 A.2d 879, 881 (1946).
81. See, e.g., Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1971); Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex.
489, 208 S.W.2d 876 (1948).
Such action by the courts would seem to violate the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Without ruling on the question
directly, the Supreme Court has found that where the law of one state permitted modification of its own decree, other states could modify the decree as well. New York ex rel.
Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). The Court also ruled that changed circumstances
in a child custody case were grounds for modification of a decree, and that the due process clause of the United States Constitution could require a state to have personal jurisdiction over both parents before its custody decree could be accorded full faith and credit
by a sister state. The Supreme Court's decision essentially left questions of jurisdiction
and modification to be decided independently by the several states.
82. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAl. LAw 177 (2d ed. 1969).
83. Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
84. See generally Katz, Legal Remedies for Child Snatching, 15 FAM. L.Q. 103, 105
(1981).
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rationale for this exemption, as expressed by Congress, was that
parents, even when acting wrongly, do what they think is best
for the child and thus lack the requisite criminal intent for conviction.8 5 Moreover, even when state kidnapping statutes did not
expressly exempt such activity, the courts often found an implicit
exemption for parents who, as natural guardians, were merely
asserting their claim to the possession of their children.8 6
In order to regain possession of the abducted child, custodial
parents were left with the civil remedies of habeas corpus or contempt.8 7 On its face, the habeas corpus action was limited to the
determination of which parent had legal custody. The courts
seized this opporunity, however, to reexamine the custody decision in light of the child's best interests.8 8 Thus, recovery of a
child under a writ of habeas corpus was by no means certain.
Furthermore, the habeas corpus action was only available in the
jurisdiction where the child was physically present.8 9 This meant
that the parent with legal custody but without possession of the
child had to travel to the forum of the abductor. If the abductor's
whereabouts were unknown, the services of a private detective
might be required, resulting in more cost and delay for the custodial parent. 90
The second remedy, a decree of civil contempt, could be used to
compel compliance with a custody ruling. Once the custody
decree had been issued, a person found in contempt of the decree
could be fined or imprisoned for continued refusal to comply with
the court order. 91 The power of the contempt citation, however,
was limited to the jurisdiction of the issuing court. A child
snatching parent could evade the contempt decree simply by
going to another state. Although some courts were loath to provide a forum to a parent charged with contempt of another court,
the plea was often heard because of the "child's best interests"
doctrine. 92 Finally, where the abductor sought merely refuge in
another state and not modification of the decree, the custodial

85. 75 CONG. REc. 13,296 (daily ed. June 17, 1932).
86. See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 129 Pa. 138, 18 A. 756 (1889).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
88. See, e..g., Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489,208 S.W.2d 876 (1948).
89. See generally Katz, supra note 84, at 124-35.
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. 631, 98 A.2d
437 (1953).
91. See, e.g., Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1971).
92. See, e.g., Leathers v. Leathers, 162 Cal. App. 2d 768, 328 P.2d 853 (1958).

19831

Child Snatching

parent had to resort to the habeas corpus action because the contempt violation did not warrant extradition proceedings.
As a result of these inadequacies, efforts were made to pass
legislation which would limit the jurisdictional discretion available to state courts in custody determinations. The first product
of these efforts was the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA").93

THE UCCJA
In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association approved
the UCCJA in order to "remedy [the] intolerable state of affairs
where self-help and the rule of 'seize and run' prevail. ' 94 Despite an initial reluctance to adopt the Act,95 by 1982 forty-seven
states had passed substantial portions of the UCCJA.96 The
UCCJA was designed to serve two purposes: it was to limit the
discretion of state courts in exercising jurisdiction over child
custody cases and to promote among the states cooperation and
the exchange of information.9 7 To avoid jurisdictional conflicts

93. See UCCJA, supra note 78.
94. Id. at 113.
95. As of 1978 only 25 states had adopted the UCCJA. See id. at 111.
96. The UCCJA has not yet been adopted in Massachusetts, Mississippi, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. For a listing of pertinent statutory
provisions as enacted in each state, see Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction,
Recognition,and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711, 720 n.60 (1982).
97. Section 1 of the Act states:
(a) The general purposes of this Act are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in the state which can best decide the case in the inter-

est of the child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection
and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is most readily available, and that the courts of this state
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer
connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the
child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to
obtain custody awards;
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and confusion, the UCCJA limited custody jurisdiction to the
state of the child's home or other significant contacts. 98 Thus,
the jurisdiction with the closest relationship with the child or the
circumstances of the case would make the custody determination. In addition, jurisdiction would lie when the child was physically present within the state and had been abandoned or was
in danger of mistreatment.99 Once the court issued a proper

(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar

as feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(b) This Act shall be construed to promote the general purpose stated in this
section.
UCCJA, supra note 78, § 1.
98. Section 3 provides:
(a) A court of the State which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within 6 months before
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State
because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for
other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this
State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he
has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected [or dependent]; or
(4) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state
has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence in
this State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child custody
determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
9 U.L.A. 122-23 (1979). See also Friedman & Marcus, The Continuing Jurisdiction
Dilemma in Interstate Child Custody Disputes, 70 ILL B.J. 304, 306 (1982).
99. Friedman & Marcus, supra note 98, at 306.
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decree, jurisdiction to modify continued in the same court until it
could no longer satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the
UCCJA, or unless it declined to modify the decree. 10 0 Concurrent
proceedings in the state courts were strictly prohibited under the Act. 1 1
The UCCJA also provided for recognition and enforcement of
out-of-state custody decrees, including the custody decrees of
states that had not yet adopted the UCCJA but nevertheless sat02
isfied its jurisdictional requirements.'
Apart from the Act's mandatory jurisdictional provisions, discretionary rules allowed a state court to decline to take jurisdiction if it believed either that another state was a more appropriate forum, 0 3 or that the petitioner had acted wrongfully by
abducting the child.10 4 Moreover, to satisfy due process requirements, the UCCJA required that proper notice be given to all
parties before the issue was adjudicated, 10 5 although it was not
necessary for all parties to be present. In addition, money for
travel could be allocated for the personal appearance of nonresi10 6
dents who claimed custody.
In spite of its virtues, the Act failed to provide a comprehensive solution to the child snatching dilemma for several reasons.
First, the UCCJA was not universally adopted. 10 7 Hence, nonadopting states still provided a haven for abducting parents
seeking modification or nonenforcement of a decree. 10 8 In addition, the UCCJA's jurisdictional provisions were sufficiently
flexible to allow states to continue the parochial pattern of free
jurisdiction.'0 9 Moreover, the UCCJA lacked the means for locat-

100. UCCJA, supra note 78, § 14.
101. Id. § 6.
102. Id. § 13. Section 12 also established that a custody decree is res judicata as to the
parties. See also UCCJA, Commissioner'sPrefatoryNote, supra note 78, at 114.
103. UCCJA, supra note 78, § 7.
104. Id. § 8. The best interests of the child standard may still preclude the use of the
clean hands doctrine, as provided in § 8(b) of the Act.
105. UCCJA, supra note 78, §§ 4-5.
106. Id. § 11(c). Although the UCCJA does not provide penalties for child snatching,
a court that declines to exercise jurisdiction because of the parent's wrongdoing may
impose all costs on that parent. Further, a parent may file a home state habeas corpus
proceeding up to six months after the abduction, thus eliminating the pre-UCCJA need to
travel to the abductor's forum. See UCCJA, supra note 78, §§ 3, 8(c) and the Commissioner's note to § 3.
107. See supra note 96.
108. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
109. See Dykes v. Dykes, 395 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Potter v. Potter,
104 Misc. 2d 930, 430 N.Y.S. 201 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980). For a complete discussion of
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ing a parent who abducted a child and then disappeared, nor did
it provide any criminal or civil penalties for such acts. In response
to these inadequacies, Congress intervened with the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA").11O
THE PKPA
Legislative History
While recognizing that child custody determinations are a
matter of state law, Congress nevertheless undertook limited
federal action to remedy the interstate jurisdictional conflicts
and to diminish the continuing problem of child abductions
across state lines.111 In February 1973, Congressman Charles
Bennett, a Democrat from Florida, introduced parental kidnap-

UCCJA drawbacks, see Coombs, supra note 96, at 723-24, 811-12. The Act also allowed a
state to determine if a sister state's exercise of jurisdiction conformed to the jurisdictional standards of the Act. See, e.g., Howard v. Howard, 378 So. 2d 1329, 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 87 Ill. App. 3d 101, 109,408 N.E.2d 952,958 (1980).
110. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568
(1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).(Supp. IV 1980).
111. (a) The Congress finds that(1) there is a large and growing number of cases annually involving disputes between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation of children
under the laws, and in the courts, of different States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories and possessions of the
United States;
(2) the law and practices by which the courts of those jurisdictions determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes, and the effect to be given the
decisions of such disputes by the courts of other jurisdictions, are often inconsistent and conflicting;
(3) those characteristics of the law and practice in such cases, along with
the limits imposed by a Federal system on the authority of each jurisdiction to
conduct its own boundaries, contribute to a tendency of parties involved in such
disputes to frequently resort to the seizure, restraint, concealment, and interstate transportation of children, the disregard of court orders, excessive relitigation of cases, obtaining of conflicting orders by the courts of various jurisdictions, and interstate travel and communication that is so expensive and time
consuming as to disrupt their occupations and commercial activities; and
(4) among the results of those conditions and activities are the failure of the
courts of such jurisdictions to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the other jurisdictions, the deprivation of the rights of liberty and property without due process of law, burdens on commerce among such jurisdictions
and with foreign nations, and harm to the welfare of children and their parents
and other custodians.
Congressional Findings & Declarations of Purposes for Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).
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ping legislation that would remove the parental exemption clause
from the Federal Kidnapping Act.1 1 2 Because the Act's sanctions were severe and would make criminals of parents who took
their own children, Bennett's proposal was unattractive politically. Knowledgeable observers viewed it as not "well suited to
make a major contribution to solution of the problem."" 3 By
January 1975, Bennett had modified his bill to provide that any
parent who kidnapped his minor child would be fined not more
4
than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."1
Although a ceiling on penalties was an important response to
critics, no further legislative action was taken until 1979 when
Senator Malcolm Wallop, a Republican from Wyoming, and
Congressman Bennett introduced substantially identical legislation in the Senate and the House. 115 The two bills proposed a
three-pronged approach which: 1) made the full faith and credit

112. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981). This Act, popularly known as the Lindbergh Law, exempted parents and provided stiff penalties, all arising from the Lindbergh
kidnapping case.
113. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10,627 (1979). See also Westgate, Child-Snatching:The Game Nobody Wins, SINGLE PARENT MAG. 8, 11 (July 1979),
reprintedin ParentalKidnapping: Hearings on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1980)
Bennett's original 1973 bill didn't pass because it was too strong; it merely
struck the 'parental exemption' clause from the Lindbergh Act. His first revision was too weak ....
Neither bill would have applied when custody had not
been awarded, and the FBI did not 'want to get into the child-collection business'. . . . Many congressmen also believed it would be hard to convict any
parent of kidnapping under that law. 'What jury would convict a loving parent
for taking his or her own child', they questioned.
Id. at 124. Hearings were held on Bennett's bill on February 27, 1974, but Subcommittee
Chairman John Conyers (D. Mich.) was frankly unenthusiastic about it and no action
was taken. See Amendments to the FederalKidnapping Statute: Hearingson H.R. 4191
and H.R. 8722 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Federal Kidnapping
Statute].
114. Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 16-19.
115. ParentalKidnapping: Hearings on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings on Parental Kidnapping]. Of the Wallop bill, Professor Russell M.
Coombs of Rutgers Law School stated:
The Wallop proposal is unique among the various proposals made over the
years for Congressional action in the soundness of its conception, in the scope
of its treatment of the federal aspects of this problem, and in the respect it
shows for the proper division of roles between the state and federal governments and between civil and criminal approaches to the problem.
Id. See also Wallop, Children of Divorce and Separation: Pawns in the Child-Snatching
Game, 15 TRIAL MAG. 36 (1979).
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clause applicable to specified custody determinations; 2) provided
that the Parental Federal Locator Service would help locate
abducted children; and 3) made kidnapping one's children a federal crime.' 16 Political opposition from the Department of Justice
and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare prevented
the adoption of such legislation until December, 1980.
Opponents to the PKPA
Persistent and strong opposition to federal parental kidnapping legislation within the two departments came specifically
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and the Paren1 7 FBI policy
tal Locator Service ("FPLS")."
frowned on Bureau
involvement in child abduction cases unless there was a local
felony charge pending and evidence of physical or moral danger
to the child."18 FBI officials considered child snatching a state
and local problem, and argued that the states could usually handle the problem on their own. 1 9 Nevertheless, the FBI was willing to make available, upon request, its laboratory and identification divisions, and to check out-of-state leads. In addition to
the policy arguments against federal intervention, the FBI maintained that a federal parental kidnapping law would require significant expenditures for additional FBI agents1 20 and would
divert manpower and resources from criminal activity allegedly
more dangerous to the nation.' 21 Further, the FBI was hesitant

116. See generally Wallop, supra note 115.
117. Westgate, supra note 113, at 44. Westgate stated:
Opponents ... are hard to find, according to [the Wallop and Bennett] staffs
and that of Senator Alan Cranston.... Curiously, three organizations with Washington legislative offices, which you might imagine would have strong stands on
the issue, do not plan to back-or oppose-the bills: The American Civil Liberties Union, Child Welfare League of America, and National Association of
Social Workers.
Id.
118. House Hearings on Federal Kidnapping Statute, supra note 113, at 55. As of
January 1980, Senator Wallop indicated the FBI was taking about 10 to 15 cases annually under these rigid criteria. See Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 7.
119. See supra note 118.
120. See House Hearings on Parental Kidnapping, supra note 115, at 22.
121. Id. at 93. An FBI spokesperson stated:
For each 5,000 cases, we estimate it would take between 160 and 205 agents at a
cost of $5.5 to $7.5 million .... In the unlawful flight program ... we currently
have over 4,000 . . . investigations under way. Most . . . involve murderers,
rapists, robbers. We think... we should concentrate on the individuals who are
of the most danger to the community as a whole.
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to become involved in "domestic relations disputes," 122 traditionally a matter of local concern.
Like the FBI, the FPLS opposed a parental kidnapping act
which would impose on it different and additional burdens. The
FPLS, which helps locate delinquent child support obligors,' 23
argued that it could not successfully locate child abductors 124
because its computer records were inadequate to uncover persons
in hiding.' 25 Moreover, use of these records might amount to an
invasion of privacy in instances where no substantial federal
interest has been shown. 126
Both opposition groups were roundly criticized, however, during the hearings. The FBI was branded as interested in investigating car thefts, but uninterested in investigating thefts of children. 127 The FPLS was accused of being concerned with support
payments, but not with rejoining children with their parent. 128
Finally, after 1978, support for the FBI and FPLS opposition
eroded as important members of Congress, bolstered by lobbying
parent-victim groups, discounted the objections.

122. Domestic relations disputes appear to be universally disliked by law enforcement
officials at all levels. See J. KAPLAN & J. SKOLNICK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 136 (3d ed. 1982).
123. The Federal Parental Locator Service provision is found at 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1976
& Supp. V 1981). Parent victims may use the service pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
124. In June 1980, a spokesperson summarized the long-held position of the FP[S:
[Wihile this system may be good for locating child support obligors, who typically do not attempt to conceal themselves, it may not be particularly successful
in locating people who are attempting to conceal themselves. Somebody who is
attempting to conceal himself may not be found in a computer check of records.
House Hearings on Parental Kidnapping, supra note 115, at 91.
125. Id.
126. The FPLS argued that to "extend the use of tax return info-mation where no
substantial Federal interest has yet been demonstrated would be inconsistent with con-

gressional and administration policies to protect most strictly privacy of taxpayers and
information supplied in their returns. See Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at
30.
127. House Hearings on Federal Kidnapping Statute, supra note 113, at 70-71. See
also Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 42.
128. See Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59:
Fathers, for example, resented bitterly the FPL.S: We want the correct use of the
Federal Parental Locator Service or else change its name to a collection agency.
This is all it is. There are collection agencies that will collect for less of a fee
than they charge .... I wouldn't mind paying a little more in taxes if I could
find a responsive Government that was more concerned with love than the
mere collection of money, personal greed and profit.
Id. at 98-99.
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Grass Roots Politics:Parent-Victim Groups
Perhaps the clearest example of politics surrounding the passage of parental kidnapping legislation was the organization of
parent-victim groups to assist new victims, publicize the child
snatching problem, and pressure state and federal legislators to
pass effective legislation. 129 Although these groups frequently
made emotional arguments, they also addressed questions concerning jurisdiction, the role of state and federal governments in
domestic relations cases, and the feasibility and desirability of
FBI and FPLS involvement. 130 By 1975, parent-victims had
formed Childrens' Rights, Inc., a national organization and an
influential political lobbying group. 3 ' Despite constant efforts
by Childrens' Rights, Inc. and other such groups, it was not until
1979 that these efforts were recognized. 32
In the fall of 1979, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice held hearings on child abduction in conjunction
with the Child and Human Development Subcommittee of the
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. These subcommittees made child abduction legislation their first priority, 133 and
in September of 1980, the Senate approved the PKPA. 134 Due to
changes in the bill and continued opposition from conservative
"pro-family" groups, however, the PKPA did not pass both
Houses until December 5, 1980.135
Impact of the PKPA
The purposes of the PKPA were to aid parents in locating
129. Politics is viewed here according to Harold Lasswell's definition as the process of
who gets what, when, and how. See H. LASSWEI.L, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, ANI)
How? (1958 ed.).

130. A consistent theme of those testifying at the hearings was that the abducting
parents' motivation was revenge against the other spouse for initiating a divorce rather
than concern for the child. For a discussion of the revenge factor in child snatching, see
Legislation to Revise and Recodify FederalCriminalLaws: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,Part I, 95th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 722 (1977-1978). Regarding nonemotional testimony, see Senate
Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 64-103.
131. See Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 70, 77.
132. ParentalKidnapping,1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human
Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
35, 164 (1979).
133. See Senate Hearings on PKPA, supra note 59, at 4-5.
134. The Act passed despite "fierce" lobbying in opposition to it by conservative
Christian groups. See 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 443 (1980).
135. 126 CONG. REc. H12,490 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980).
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abducted children, to eliminate the safe havens in states that
had not adopted the UCCJA, and to compel states to give full
faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of other states. 136 Although the PKPA addressed the inadequacies of the UCCJA and
the demands of parent-victims, it too had weaknesses. For example, the full faith and credit provision attempted to eliminate
forum shopping by the dissatisfied party.' 37 Thus, under the
PKPA, the original custody determination must be honored in
other states if the issuing state had proper jurisdiction under the
Act. 138 If, however, the issuing state had not complied with the
Act's jurisdictional requirements, its decision would not have to
be respected in other jurisdictions. 139 In addition, the PKPA
makes the exercise of jurisdiction to modify a custody decree an
"and" proposition; the court requested to modify the decree must
have jurisdiction under the Act and the state which issued the
original decree must no longer have jurisdiction or have declined
to exercise it.140 Despite this provision, some states have made
this an "or" proposition,' 41 thus raising additional full faith and
credit questions.
Ostensibly, the PKPA provides access to the FLPS. 142 Although this service has been successful in locating parents
attempting to evade child support obligations,' 43 parents of
abducted children cannot apply directly to the FPLS. A state or
federal representative must do so on the parent's behalf.144 The
parent may have to petition the state court to request FLPS
136. See supra note 111.
137. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
138. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(d), (g) (Supp. IV 1980).
139. See, e.g., State ex. rel Valles v. Brown, 97 N.M. 327, 639 P.2d 1181 (1981). The
New Mexico court held that Arizona did not have jurisdiction under the PKPA to grant
custody and thus New Mexico was not required to give Arizona's decision full faith and

credit.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
141. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
2114-2115 (1981) in which Illinois may modify
a decree issued in another state if that state did not have jurisdiction, declined jurisdiction, or if Illinois has jurisdiction.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
143. The FPLS was established in 1976 and has been operating successfully since
then. See supra note 123. The FPLS relies on the Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Department, the Veteran's Administration, the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation (Coast Guard), the National Personnel Records Center of the
General Services Administration, Post Office records, and state tax and employment files
for its information.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). On October 21, 1981, Senator Wallop
complained that the service was still unavailable. 127 CONG. REc. S11,811 (daily ed. Oct.
21, 1981).
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involvement, thereby complicating and protracting the search
for the missing child.
Although the PKPA provides for FBI involvement,'4 5 the
Bureau's reluctance to involve itself in child snatching cases has
continued. For example, the Justice Department has interpreted
the PKPA to require a state to prosecute under its parental kid146 If
napping felony statute once the FBI locates the abductor.
the abduction occurs prior to the issuance of a decree, however, it
is generally considered not a violation of the statute. The FBI
can therefore decline to participate. Similarly, there can be no
FBI involvement in the many states which have no parental
kidnapping statute. Moreover, regardless of the existence of a
state statute, the Justice Department will not involve the FBI
unless there is "independent credible information that the child
is in physical danger or is then in a condition of abuse or neglect."1 47 As a result of these restrictions, of the 576 parental
complaints received from December 28, 1980 to September 30,
1981, only 99 were eligible for consideration and the FBI was
actually involved in only 31.148 The PKPA's ameliorating provisions have thus reached only an insignificant number of complaints.
MODERN REMEDIES
Two changes in the criminal and civil remedies related to child
snatching may stem the problem substantially in the future.
First, a number of state legislatures have removed the parental
immunity provisions from kidnapping laws, 149 and state courts
have convicted parents for child snatching as a result.1 50 Parents with visitation rights or with joint custody who fail to

145. The Fugitive Felon Act allows FBI involvement in parental kidnapping situations. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
146. The Department of Justice, Report on Implementation of Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980 1-2 (Apr. 1981) (available from the government document office).
147. Id. at 3.
148. The Department of Justice, Report on Implementation of Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980 1-2 (Nov. 1981) (available from the government document office).
Senator Wallop concluded that "the department is not properly implementing the program." He introduced Senate bill 1759 which would force the FBI to take a more active

role in parental kidnapping cases. S.1759, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S11,811
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1981).
149. See Katz, supranote 84, at 14147 (Table of State Criminal Statutes).
150. State v. Kracker, 123 Ariz. 294, 599 P.2d 250 (1979); People v. Hyatt, 18 Cal. App.
3d 621, 96 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1971).
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return the child will now be prosecuted.' 5 ' In addition, some
prosecuting states have attempted to make it a felony to detain a
child in another state. 15 2 Such statutes, however, may be beyond
the reach of state jurisdiction. 53 Thus, a uniform approach to
criminal liability for child abduction may be more appropriate.
In addition to criminal liability, state and federal courts have
recently recognized that tort liability may be imposed upon a
child snatching parent. Historically, a father could recover in
tort for the deprivation of his child's working services, 54 but this
cause of action has been discredited in modern times.' 55 Recent
cases have based liability on the breach of a duty to not deprive
a legal custodian of custody. The source of this duty is derived
most often from a state kidnapping statute.15 6 In Louisiana, for
instance, the court of appeals allowed a plaintiff father $6,000 in
57
damages for the removal of his children by his former wife.1
The kidnapping statute formed the basis of the legal duty to the
father to not remove the children, and the ensuing debate over
1 58
custody did not negate the breach of that duty.
A child abduction statute is not the only source of the legal
duty however. Even where there is no statute or where parents
are immune from prosecution, it "does not mean that what is
obviously an invasion of a [parent's] legal right is not a legal
wrong."1 59 The legal duty can be found in the custodial arrangement of the parties. 160 In fact, although a judicial grant of sole
legal custody is ordinarily a prerequisite to recovery for deprivation of custody,' 6' a contractual separation agreement has supported such a claim.1 62 The agreement vests the custodial party
with a superior right to the child "until such time as the matter
[is] resolved in court as stipulated in [the] agreement."' 163

151. Id. See also People v. Harrison, 82 Ill. App. 3d 530,402 N.E.2d 822 (1980).
152. See, e.g., State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978).
153. Id. at 626-27.
154. See, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913).
155. See generally,Katz, supra note 84, at 114.
156. Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 1979); Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221
Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963).
157. 373 So. 2d at 204.
158. Id. at 202-03.
159. 221 Cal. App. 2d at 430, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 156.
162. Laranjo v. Laranjo, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2522 (1980).

163. Id.
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Once the threshold duty question has been resolved and causation established, the issue of damages must be assessed. 16 4 In
addition to general damages for the costs of recovering the child,
special damages for emotional distress are often awarded. In one
case, a father was awarded $70,000 for the loss of society of his
abducted daughter, the expenses incurred in attempting to regain
her custody, and severe mental distress.1 65 The continuing efforts
to conceal the child's whereabouts entitled the father to punitive
damages in the amount of $25,000, with an additional assessment of $2,000 per month until the child's return. 66
Although tort liability is a secondary remedy in the field of
child abduction since it does not effect the child's return directly,
it may deter an abducting parent who, prior to the establishment
of tort liability, did not face the specter of special or punitive
damages. In addition, because such tort claims do not involve a
custody ruling, the injured party is not limited to actions in state
court; the plaintiff may proceed in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. 167 Although the tort remedy may be limited by the

inability to locate the missing parent and child, it is nonetheless
a very potent weapon in the battle to find a legal resolution that
deters, rather than encourages, child abduction.
Another possible means for solving divorce and child custody
problems, including child abduction, is to divert divorcing couples from the adversarial legal system altogether. 6 8 Mediation

164. See Katz, supra note 84, at 117.
165. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
166. Id.
167. Diversity jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 where the parties to the
action are, inter alia, citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds
the sum of $10,000.
168. Divorce and family law mediation organizations and literature are proliferating
rapidly. A sampling of these organizations are: (1) the Special Committee on Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution, American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. The Committee serves as a national resource center on alternative dispute resolutions, such as
mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. It provides information, publications, and technical assistance to programs, governmental agencies, lawyers, and individuals throughout the United States. In January 1983, the staff director of the committee provided the
authors a potpourri of newspaper clippings, unpublished manuscripts, and other documents which aided in the preparation of this article; (2) the Family Mediation Association, Washington, D.C. The Association is dedicated to enhancing the quality of family
life through cooperative processes involving marital separation and divorce; and (3) the
American Arbitration Association, New York, New York. The Community Dispute Services
Department and Family Dispute Service use conciliation, mediation, and the issuance of
a binding arbitration award when necessary. The Association has regional officers and
serves about 25 cities in the United States.
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outside the adversarial system may be less costly than the traditional process in money, time, and emotional scarring. 169 The
primary purposes of mediating a divorce are to instill cooperation rather than competition among participants, to permit separation with the least amount of emotional damage to parents
and children, to permit shared custody arrangements, and to
have the parties share in decisions to avoid post-judgment litigation. There is, apparently, general recognition that "the legal
system itself-the time-honored adversary system-is better
designed to produce a confrontation than a mutually acceptable
termination of marriage.1 70 If mediation works to ease the
financial and psychological strains of divorce, it may also be
useful in preventing child snatching. 171

169. Lawyers too have become involved in divorce mediation. Richard E. Crouch,
Consulting Editor of the Family Law Reporter and Chairman of the ABA Family Law
Section's Ethics Committee has considered the arguments against lawyers mediating
divorces: "There is danger of ethics code violations and malpractice liability for lawyers,
along with tremendous potential for the exploitation of unsuspecting clients." Crouch,
The Dark Side is Still Unexplored, 4 FAM. AI)VOC. 33, 33 (1982).
170. L.A. Times, May 11, 1982, § 5, at 1.
171. See M. AGOPIAN, supra note 60, at 98-106 (1981) where the author makes these
recommendations for dealing with child snatching: 1) create state and federal laws
against child snatching; 2) increase the use of joint custody awards; 3) establish appropriate international treaties concerning parental child-stealing and child custody awards;
4) require parents to post a security bond with the court; and 5) provide special training
for judges. Agopian merely mentions promoting "negotiations of custody conditions
between ex-spouses prior to a custody award," id. at 105, and does not discuss the burgeoning movement of mediation and community-based dispute settlement centers.
Community dispute settlement centers in which laypersons are trained to mediate
problems ranging from neighborhood nuisances to divorce settlements appear to be
springing up frequently. The director of the Linn County, Iowa Community Dispute Settlement Center, Peg Cronk, was interviewed in January 1983, less than a month after
opening the center. According to Cronk, community mediation centers grew out of the

National Justice Centers that were established in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Kansas City
by Attorney General Griffin Bell during the Carter administration to determine the subject areas most successfully handled by centers, as well as the most appropriate source
and control of funding. It was discovered that when the judiciary controlled the distribution of funds, the support of the legal community was more assured. In Iowa, the state
legislature appropriated $100,000 to be disbursed to centers by the Iowa Supreme Court.
The key to success in these centers, in Cronk's view, lies in diverting persons from the
adversarial legal system to the peaceful resolution of disputes through mediation.
Acknowledging the need for professional training in marital dispute areas, Cronk questioned whether persons undergoing a bitter marital break up could be enticed to use the
center's services or whether layperson mediators could handle such a case. Interview
with Peg Cronk, Director of the Linn County, Iowa Community Dispute Settlement Center (Jan. 13, 1983).
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CONCLUSION

The role of the legal system in identifying, characterizing, and
offering solutions to child snatching, although laudable, may
have delayed more effective ways of achieving the goal of preventing child abduction by parents. One can argue that federal
parental kidnapping legislation deals only with the symptom,
child snatching, rather than the underlying problem of adjusting
the contested child custody system to reflect societal changes in
parenting roles and expectations.1 7 2 While the legal system has
moved relatively quickly toward containing the symptom, it has
only begun to experiment with solutions to the underlying
73
problem.
Because the United States is a highly litigious society, it is not
surprising that the impact of social change is felt in some
instances by those in the legal field first, before those outside the
system even begin a serious analysis of the problem. It was lawyers who initially framed the child snatching problem in terms
of the UCCJA.17 4 Rather than preventing an abduction, that act
may have caused the abducting parent to go underground and
avoid attempts by the custodial parent to obtain legal custody in
another jurisdiction. This result produces a greater evil still in
that the victim parent loses contact with the child, while the
child suffers both the loss of one parent and the lack of a stable
home environment due to frequent and oftentimes sudden moves
from state to state.
The mental set of legal system actors understandably constrains recommended solutions to traditional legal means. But in
the child custody area especially, losers are often left with little.
A solution must be found so that divorcing parents and their
children share in the winning. On this view, the UCCJA and
PKPA will not succeed because of the limits of the law and the
legal system itself.175 Indeed, the legal system appears to malfunction in contested child custody cases causing considerable
human suffering as well as a dangerous erosion of faith in the
legal system and the rule of law.
There appears to be a general dissatisfaction with the child

172.
173.
174.
175.

See supra notes 7-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-112 and 138-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-110.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-49.
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custody system. 176 Admittedly, an extremely emotional and difficult problem is involved: What happens to the family when
spouses divorce? The most appropriate remedy to child snatching may be to divert divorcing couples with children from the
present win-lose system. The reasons are obvious: 1) to truly
serve the best interests of the child by continuing a relationship,
when beneficial and not dangerous, with both parents; 2) to
adjust the concept of family to a post-divorce stage (divorce need
not be the end of the family unit); and 3) to protect the sanctity
of the law upon which our society so much depends.
It appears to us that two things are necessary at this juncture.
The first is empirical research into the scope, magnitude, and
character of the gap now existing between societal and rhetorical
changes involving parental roles and the capacity of the legal
system to deal with these. Second, we need a continued exploration of alternatives to the present system and an evaluation of
these in action. 177 These two things should occur quickly, for the
stakes-the family and the rule of law-are extremely high.

176. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
177. See King, Child Custody-A Legal Problem?, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 156, 157 (1979).
King, a domestic relations judge in San Francisco, states:
It seems incredible to tie up a courtroom, a court clerk, a court reporter, a bailiff
and a judge, not to mention supporting court personnel, to resolve a human
problem-which of two parents is best suited to have custody of their child....

Child custody is a legal problem only because the Legislature, by statute,
requires the judge to decide it. In reality, it is not a legal problem. It is a human
problem, an interpersonal problem....

